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Voltaire’s somewhat facetious criticism of
certain Biblical texts, &dquo;dans un livre saint un
peu d’exactitude ne nuirait pas,&dquo; can be ap-
plied to current writings on the Arab-Israeli
conflict. A good amount of the work is an
~ ~ z
1The author wishes to acknowledge his indebted-
ness to Ziva Reuveni and Rosalind Daly, without
whose help this review would have been impos-
sible. Daniel Heradstveit and Johan Galtung (Oslo)
have been instrumental in suggesting the type of
approach argued for in this review.
extension of traditional work on the Middle
East. Orientalists, staunch adherents of the
historical-philological approach, wrote dic-
tionaries and grammars alike, &dquo;through a
very considerable amount of additions and
translations of texts, to histories of wider or
narrower scope&dquo; (van Nieuwenhuijze, 1965,
p. 1). The taste of a wider public was served
by travelogues which gradually expanded into
general descriptions of regions or countries:
descriptions in which a preoccupation with
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politics in the Western sense of the term has
tended to increase and in which palatability
to the Western lay public has often but not
always been matched by accuracy or verifica-
tion on the spot (ibid.).
l. Current Work on the Conflict:
Some Lugubrious Thoughts
The most typical and predictable trend in
work on the present conflict has been the
growth of a polemical literature which over-
emphasizes background dimensions, substan-
tive matters, and the value of social justice
while buttressing the case for one party or
another. This has been particularly and pain-
fully true for efforts entitled with supposedly
&dquo;scientific&dquo; labels and originating from &dquo;re-
search&dquo; centers (e.g. Kadi, 1966; al-Khalidi,
1958; Sayegh, 1961, 1965). The three wars
(1948, 1956, and especially 1967) accelerated
the rate of publications of &dquo;quickies&dquo; in West-
ern countries and the Middle East. Many of
the books which have been published since
the 1967 war in the US, while not easily lend-
ing themselves to the categories of research
articulated above, have been more sophisti-
catedly biased, the case being made more
often than not for Israel (e.g., Love, 1969;
Prittie, 1968; Kimche and Bawly, 1969).
Such streams of publications are not likely
to dry up in the foreseeable future. Yet some
gradual change has already been coming
about in the broad picture of Middle Eastern
studies through the introduction of such dis-
ciplinary approaches as modern sociology as
well as some honest attempts to cope with
questions of cultural relativity-typified by
the works of Berger and van Neiuwenhuijze
(1962 and 1965). Thus one kind of difficulty
in our job is relating the five works in review
to certain needs of inquiry in the field of con-
flict management, reduction, or resolution.
It should be obvious that we are referring
essentially to even more advanced interdis-
ciplinary approaches, comparative in nature
(in the sense of possible generalization be-
yond language or culture area, etc.), and
quantitative in orientation.
The main problem with this criterion, how-
ever, is that in the service of peace one must
also try to find value in any contributions
that deal with the Israeli-Arab conflict, inas-
much as the works can offer innovative redef-
inition of the issues involved, strategies for
&dquo;defreezing&dquo; the situation, and perhaps more
balanced understanding of the factors in-
volved. The works under review make little
progress in any of these directions, though:
all of them are redundant to an extent and
only the last one has some qualities of the
kind of work we envisage on the Arab-Israeli
conflict. However, each one of them carries
with it certain advantages over earlier work,
and I will attempt to extract a few of these
points and interrelate them to a suggested
frame of reference for further research. Be-
fore doing this, I will briefly review each of
the works within what we consider to be their
sociopolitical context.
2. A European Work in Search
of Social Justice
Francos’ book is typical of the anti-Israel
left in France. Behind her entire argument
runs a thread of personal history. Quite often
in the case of Jews it is related to the Holo-
caust, and nearly always a resemblance is
found between US-dominated Vietnam and
Israel. Francos is a Jew whose parents had
emigrated to Palestine in the 1920s only to
return to Europe, disillusioned, several years
later. They were both killed at Auschwitz. Her
immediate experiences before spending three
years with the Fedayeen’ (in Syria and Jor-
2I shall use Fedayeen interchangeably with
Palestinians. The name Fedayeen (i.e., in Arabic,
"those who sacrifice themselves") was introduced
to the Israeli-Arab conflict by Egyptian authori-
ties in 1955 as the official label for irregulars dis-
patched into Israel on subversive missions. In this
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dan) were in Algeria and Cuba. Hence her
psychological need to articulate the oppres-
sion of the Palestinians is understandable.
Her position reminds one of Rodinson’s inter-
pretation of the Arab-Israeli conflict as &dquo;the
struggle of an indigenous population against
the occupation of part of its national terri-
tory by foreigners&dquo; (Rodinson, 1969). The
book is a personal account with considerable
frankness. It is valuable in that it captures the
way that Palestinians think, and especially
their reality. She does not attempt to analyze
the situation beyond suggesting that the Pal-
estinians have a case. It is precisely because
of her bias that some of Francos’ criticisms
are valuable. For instance, she attacks some
Palestinian leaders for the luxuries they en-
joy and evaluates Shukeiry’s tactics-notably
through an examination of his Palestinian
Liberation Organization and its manipulation
by Arab governments to control the Pales-
tinian problem. Her revealing analysis of the
friction between Arab bourgeoisie and Pales-
tinian refugees, as well as tensions she de-
scribes in Arab establishments vis-a-vis the
growing strength and salience of the Fedayeen
-all of these discussions may help to clarify
certain moods and strategies chosen by the
Fedayeen.
There are nuclear points in Francos’ anal-
ysis that deserve more articulation and lend
themselves to more systematic study. An il-
lustration is her conclusion that Palestinians
have been developing ideological predisposi-
tions and social organizations different from
those of the populations and countries in
which they reside. Beyond the simple proposi-
tion that there are Nasserites in Egypt, Baath-
ists in Syria, etc., it appears that, concomitant
with the process of communicative &dquo;unifica-
tion&dquo; among Palestinians, one also needs to
discussion we do not deal with Palestinian refugees
(actually the majority) who are not associated with
the organizations currently active against Israel and
Zionism.
obtain a deeper insight into a much less
studied dimension, namely, the Palestinian
interaction with the various host societies.
A second important focus in Francos’ re-
search is on events shaping the history of
the Fedayeen, particularly the Karameh af-
fair (in March 1968), suggesting implicitly
that the steady increase of the Fedayeen de-
pends at least partially on opportunities to
stand out, brave and able, against the Israelis.
Galle (1968) dismisses Francos’ study as a
&dquo;propaganda tract.&dquo; In my opinion he does
so because of his preference for balanced pre-
sentations (see Galle, 1968 and 1969). Ob-
viously, one cannot compare Francos’ work
to Rouleu et al. (1967), a dialogue between
two much more informed journalists guided
by an experienced moderator (see Kapeliuk,
1969). Francos’ book is more in the style and
the mood of Givet (1968), where questions of
anti-Israeli attitude are further expressed only
to demonstrate the confusion as well as the
difficulty in relating the complex Israeli-Arab
relationship to Jewish consciousness in the
European left.
3. An Israeli Strategical Perspective
If one takes Francos to be total emotional-
ity, Harkabi (1969) is nothing but rationality.
Harkabi was the Israeli chief of military in-
telligence from 1955 to 1959. Since then he
has been academically concerned with the
Arab-Israeli conflict. His doctoral disserta-
tion (1968) is the most lucid, systematic study
of Arab ideology in the conflict. Western
readers, however, had already been presented
with fragments of his analysis of the Arab
collapse in the Six Day War (Harkabi, 1967)
and a general brief summary of the confronta-
tion (Harkabi, 1965). More than anyone else,
Alter (1968) succeeded in putting both the
background and the motivation of Harkabi’s
work in a nutshell.
There is an enormous lack of symmetry in the
positions of the two antagonists. The Israeli posi-
104
tion on the Arabs over the years has on occasion
been stupid, blundering, unfeeling, but it has also
showed aspects of common sense, even humanity,
especially since June, 1967, and, by and large, one
can say that its guiding principle has been en-
lightened self-interest. The Arab position on Israel,
by contrast, has been blind, fanatic, self-deceptive,
self-destructive, harshly inflexible, and in many
respects morally obscene.
Harkabi is a true representative of the Is-
raeli establishment inasmuch as he stresses
the articulation of problems and flaws in
Israel’s enemies, while advancing the general
thesis that there is no chance for Israel to be
accepted by the Arabs or, conversely, any
justification for coming to terms with Arab
grievances so long as Arabs are not able to
perform as a responsible party to the conflict.
Typical of his line of thought is a comparison
of the 1964 Covenant of the PLO (Jerusalem),
that is, of its &dquo;shaping,&dquo; and the fourth
meeting in 1968 when the Covenant was
changed. Harkabi’s analysis emphasizes the
use of the word covenant (and not charter) in
order to convey the sacredness of their nation-
alism and the accompanying vows. An ob-
vious deduction from this type of analysis is
that the Palestinians’ stand does not allow
any possibility of reconciliation; one could
further infer from this that their position is
more rigid than Israel’s and must be con-
sidered a primary hurdle to peace.
Harkabi is gearing a large amount of his
effort towards educating Israelis about the
necessity of living with the conflict for a long
time. An important corollary of this orienta-
tion is that there is little likelihood of Arab
society progressing in the desired direction.
In the work under review his emphasis is on
ideology and strategy. His analysis is the op-
posite of Francos’, not only in that he shows
the immorality and extreme refractory strat-
egies of the Fedayeen but that he also docu-
ments his argument quite skillfully, using such
primary sources as Fatah pamphlets and
Arab strategists’ work. An example of his ef-
fort is a presentation of early Arab treatises
that criticize the chosen path of guerrilla war-
fare, and spell out the differences between
Palestine and Algeria (or other revolutionary
wars)-an exercise not prevalent at all in
present Arab writing (see, for an exception,
’Alush in Harkabi, 1969, pp. 18-19).
Compared with Francos, Harkabi evi-
dences more of an analysis, albeit impression-
istic, of political, psychological, and social
dimensions of the conflict. He is particularly
convincing in his detailed study of discrep-
ancies between the Fedayeen’s stated goals
and their implementation. Often, however,
the study takes a polemical approach to the
issues, as when its author declares that
&dquo;Fatah knows that it cannot establish a
defended base either in the occupied terri-
tories or in Israel proper&dquo; (Harkabi, 1969,
p. 34). While this &dquo;reality&dquo; was certainly the
case when Harkabi wrote the statement in
London in 1968, he knew only too well that
his assertion would be irrelevant to Fatah’s
strategy then, as well as in subsequent months
when Fedayeen activity intensified.
In effect, Harkabi’s hard thinking does
not transcend the imperative of Israel-Arab
peace, per se. Considerable correspondence
with many of his assessments can be found in
Arab literature, all the way from semi-official
statements in an Egyptian daily to scholarly
works like Sharabi (1969). However, quite
typical of all these statements, but particularly
intriguing, is the fact that even an Israeli Arab
such as M. Wated reacts vehemently to such
an analysis.3 Wated is closer to understanding
both Israel’s position and some of the Arab
inadequacies (see, for example, Wated on the
role of the intermediary in the Arab world).
&dquo;He did some research and came to the con-
clusion that the Arabs are first class liars and
3Excellent statements and elaboration on this
discussion can be found in the Israeli Daily, Ma&aacute;riv.
See the articles, "Reflections of an Arab Scholar
after the Six Day War," Nov. 11, 1969; "The Pales-
tinian Covenant and its Meaning," Dec. 12, 1969;
and "Reflections of an Israeli Arab," Dec. 5, 1969.
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that their national consciousness is super-
ficial&dquo; ( New Outlook Symposium, 1969, p.
120). Hard thinking on this conflict, then,
cannot be accepted by Arabs, inasmuch as
they read humiliating elements into the
literature.
4. Symposia in Search of Peace
Different from Francos, though also polit-
ically left, and different from Harkabi, though
also mainly Israeli, is the New Outlook Sym-
posium. In the case of the Middle East it has
been said that &dquo;A complicating and inhibiting
factor in the quest for peace is that the search
is almost an exclusive monopoly of the leftist
groups&dquo; (Merlin, 1968, p. 237). This state-
ment seems particularly appropriate here in
that it underscores the need for unorthodox
ways of achieving peace as well as the willing-
ness of some participants to take risks for the
very reason that they are objectively as well
as subjectively less committed to defending
establishment positions and goals.
The New Outlook Symposium is a most in-
teresting collection of statements from Israel.
It indicates not only the desire for peace but
the general awareness that peace requires con-
cessions, that the Palestinians have often been
mistreated by Israelis, and that the expectancy
has not been matched by comparable initia-
tives on the Arab side. In view of our com-
ments on Francos, it should be noted that
foreign contributors to the symposium appear
much less informed and much less innovative,
when compared with their Israeli counter-
parts, about the real goals and the real con-
straints. For instance, Horovitz, who notes
that &dquo;understanding begins with children,&dquo;
completely ignores the many difficulties al-
ready encountered in Jewish-Arab coeduca-
tion in Israel (New Outlook Symposium,
1969, pp. 151-152).
Amongst the Israeli participants several
issues seem to be paramount: one is in their
explicit awareness of the internal and external
hazards the movement for Greater Israel
represents, and therefore statements about
borders, expansion, and other aspects of ter-
ritoriality emphasize a minimalistic approach.
Another concern shared by most participants
is how to deal with the Arabs, coexistence
being the first goal-the second &dquo;stage&dquo; hope-
fully leading to more cooperation. Manipula-
tion of the situation so as to meet the Arabs
at some acceptable point is precisely where
most people in the symposium feel that very
little can be achieved in the immediate future.
Clearly most of them agree that escalation is
not going to bring the participants together,
and in this respect the symposium is extremely
responsive to the kind of criticism generally
advanced against Israel in Arab circles. It
might prove difficult to elaborate on the vari-
ous opinions for solving the conflict beyond
these general descriptions, simply because the
symposium reflects the entire political spec-
trum in Israel with the exception of the ex-
treme right and the Movement for Greater
Israel, which is, at most, a minute group.
In two areas the symposium appears to be
very distant from the Israeli majority. The
first area consists of the hazardous effects of
the conflict on Israeli society. For instance,
Arieli, a history professor in Jerusalem, com-
pares Israel in seclusion to Sparta ( New Out-
look Symposium, 1969, pp. 83-84). Quite a
few participants make it clear that they view
the Israeli situation vis-a-vis the occupied ter-
ritories negatively, not only because it blocks
the chances for peace, but because they be-
lieve that the values and realities of Israeli
society have been pushed far away from any
moral or historical goal that Zionism ever
sought (for example, Yalin-Mor, New Out-
look Symposium, 1969, p. 192).
A fascinating final session of the symposi-
um deals with the Palestinian refugee prob-
lem (March 30, 1969). Nearly all of the
participants offered a diagnosis of the situa-
tion based on acceptance of the Palestinian
movement-which is probably the most
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sound general agreement coming from the
symposium. Most participants also support
absorption of a certain number of Arab
refugees in Israel. Apropos of this approach,
Shamir’s statement concerning the immediate
need for the establishment’s formulation of a
policy with a Palestinian orientation, to be
proclaimed in a formal, serious, and sincere
manner, is probably the most convincing one
(New Outlook Symposium, 1969, pp. 193-
99). It is encouraging to know that such a
view is held by a person associated with the
semi-official and very respected Shiloah Re-
search Institute of Tel-Aviv University.
It is too early to measure, let alone evalu-
ate, the impact that the symposium will have
on Arab circles. There have not been any
known symposia in Arab countries that re-
sponded to the Israeli quest or, for that
matter, to any international organization
asking for similar efforts. In fact, in over
1,000 treatises on the conflict appearing in
Arab countries, there is not even the slightest
acknowledgment of the symposium or efforts
like it. It appears that The Arab World, in a
special issue, has provided somewhat of a
deviant collection of statements by scholars,
most of whom are of Palestinian descent. This
is probably an embryonic extension to match
the progressive call from Israel. Though not
emphasizing peace as the goal, and with a far
from balanced approach to the conflict, Abu-
Lughod’s collection is a welcome contribu-
tion to the dialogue. Appearing in the United
States, this collection is no less consciously
directed to the public than the New Outlook
Symposium. The focus is on Israeli abuse of
Palestinians as well as on legal issues deriving
from the recent confrontation, the lack of
responsible attitudes, religious life, etc.-
clearly issues in which full agreement on ini-
tiatives can be found with the New Outlook
participants. While some of the studies in the
collection (for example, Suleiman, pp. 59-65)
do not warrant a thorough reading due to
their methodological and statistical inade-
quacies, others such as Abu-Lughod’s article
on Israel-Arab policy (pp. 31-39) and Cherif
Bassiouni’s contribution on the international
legal aspects of the conflict (pp.41-51) convey
important points.
5. A Search for Grounds for
US Policy?
One of the participants in Abu-Lughod’s
collection is Hisham Sharabi, the author of
the next work under review (Sharabi, 1969).
Sharabi, a graduate of the American Uni-
versity of Beirut and the University of Chi-
cago, is of Palestinian origin, and hence his
sympathies. His work on the Middle East has
been in the field of contemporary comparative
politics, which he teaches at Georgetown
University and the John Hopkins School of
Advanced International Studies.
The analytical tool which he uses in exam-
ining the May-June prelude to the 1967 war
consists of a comparison of the negotiable
and the nonnegotiable categories in the an-
tagonists’ positions. He is not convincing in
his argument, which is that the crisis of 1967
has been received by Arabs primarily &dquo;in
terms of fundamental human rights,&dquo; that is,
the Palestinian Arabs’ right to their land and
home (Sharabi, 1969, p. 124; also in Abu-
Lughod, 1968, p. 29). His contention is one of
many squarely refuted by all the other works
on review (notably Francos). The assertion
that Nasser wanted to achieve maximum
&dquo;easy&dquo; gains in the prelude, with the explicit
assumption that the Israelis would not fight,
escapes a fair analysis. Sharabi’s analysis of
the basic assumptions and goals of Israeli
strategy and credibility and the gaps in its
credibility are better formulated, though he
pushes his case too far with his suggestion of
a &dquo;compulsion&dquo; in Israel (in terms of its hard
strategies) to engage in all-out defensive war.
Likewise, Sharabi’s analysis is too heavily
influenced by the logic and frame of reference
of his Arab sources-in fact, to that extent his
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work compares unfavorably with the analysis
of CBS correspondent Winston Burdett
(1969), who has no command of the antago-
nists’ languages. For example, the dilemma of
going to war in Israel, especially the weight of
possible losses in civil and military popula-
tions, receives better treatment from a &dquo;non-
professional.&dquo; More central to Sharabi’s
brief is his analysis of American foreign policy
in the Middle East-yet it is not nearly as in-
tensive an examination as the one Burdett
offers. Sharabi dwells on &dquo;grave shortcomings
and failures of the policy decisions in differ-
ent administrations&dquo; from Truman to Nixon.
Following Richard P. Stevens and others
(Sharabi, 1969, p. 30), he advocates less
American military aid and diplomatic support
for Israel. He explicitly favors a United States
policy involving &dquo;a determination to resist
internal pressure and to act solely in accor-
dance with the requirements of regional and
global peace&dquo; (Sharabi, 1969, p. 217). His
analysis falls short of specifying what this
means but, since it is viewed as a condition
capable of effecting a &dquo;radical change and of
inducing Israel to accept a settlement not
dictated by itself as victor&dquo; (ibid.), the impli-
cation is clear. A closer look at the politics
and specifics of his suggested strategy regard-
ing US policy and regionally-defined peace in
the Middle East is necessary before we can
seriously consider Sharabi’s ideas.
Sharabi’s work is particularly interesting
for his treatment of Arab society and its in-
ternal processes in confrontation with a tech-
nologically superior adversary. His in-depth
study of decision-making in Arab countries
and amongst the Palestinians parallels Har-
kabi’s and Francos’ analyses. It is, however,
precisely the question of the Palestinians that
eludes his understanding. When he seeks to
elucidate the grounds on which the prospects
for peace lie, he fails. He informs us, for
example (1969, p. 220) that:
Ironically, Palestinian resistance, if it did indeed
escape destruction and succeeded in growing into a
popular revolutionary force capable of sustaining
protracted warfare, would in part have Israel’s
Zionist leadership and its policy of domination to
thank.
6. A Sophisticated Approach to
Coercion
Nadav Safran is the author of the most en-
compassing work under survey (Safran, 1969).
Born in Cairo, he spent several years in Israel.
Somewhat like Sharabi, he has been academ-
ically productive in the United States, in an
area related to his earlier experience: compar-
ative Middle East politics. Previous work on
Egypt and Israel have made Safran particu-
larly suitable for the task of using effectively
the Ford International grant which he re-
ceived for this research.
Safran’s focus is on coercion in the context
of inter-Arab and big power relations. The
most obvious aspect of his work (in com-
parison with the existing literature on the
Arab-Israeli conflict) is the systematic search
for trends over countries and over time. Care-
ful to define each of the facets of coercion in
terms of meaningfulness (toward different
facets of coercion and other components of
the analysis), operational definition, and
sources, the author offers us a replicable
study, which can of course be extended to
later periods (see Appendix A in Safran, 1969,
pp.421-34).
Safran’s analysis should be diametrically
viewed against the above-reviewed &dquo;inter-
pretations&dquo; which fundamentally involve two
sets of incompatible claims, attitudes, and
points of view. In numerous places Safran
demonstrates the necessity of a closer look at
issues in order to answer such questions as
(1969, p. 146):
1. Who has been &dquo;responsible&dquo; for initiating
the race between Egypt and Israel which
has remained at the center of the accumula-
tion of arms in the area? and
2. Who has been &dquo;responsible&dquo; for escalating
it at various points?
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In essence, though, there is nothing new in his
answer-which is that neither Israel nor
Egypt has been responsible; rather, he con-
cludes that the arms race derives from the dif-
ferent perspectives from which they were
bound to view things ( ibid. ). In terms of our
previous discussion, Safran’s work demon-
strates succinctly that efforts like Sharabi’s
need more homework. Furthermore, Safran’s
type of analysis offers the frame of reference
necessary to pinpoint when antagonists en-
gage in military buildup. For example, we can
see the spillover effect of the Egyptian-Israeli
race into the area as a whole (see Safran, Fig.
21, p. 192) and the feedback effect of the arms
race on inter-Arab relations as well as in-
ternal ones. Safran explicates and interrelates
aspects of the dynamics and strain of arms
buildup, effects on the relation of forces, com-
parative sacrifices imposed by the arms race,
anticipation of war and the resultant &dquo;prepar-
atory&dquo; patterns, etc.
What makes Safran’s work even more
relevant is that the foregoing analyses are in-
terwoven with an historical introduction to
the conflict, focusing first on pan-Arabism,
inter-Arab organizations, and problems of
Arab unity-and then on the big power in-
terest pressures and involvement in the con-
flict. Finally, he relates the specific events
leading to and constituting the 1967 war.
Politically, almost every important item of in-
formation is accurately presented and ana-
lyzed. However, precisely because of this lay-
out, one may miss some of the interrelations
between the various parts of the analysis.
Safran leaves them &dquo;unhomogenized&dquo; in
terms of types of quantification, propinquity,
and definitiveness of conclusion. This seems
to be partly because Safran measures GNP
and defense expenditures that are readily
available but does not &dquo;extract&dquo; quantifiable
trends in his evaluation of inter-Arab politics
or big power behavior-data which are
harder to obtain or satisfactorily define. Thus
some promising avenues in regression and
correlation analysis, as well as covariance,
are still open. Such trend-seeking work is
badly needed if only to enable us to decipher
the fuller meaning of each point in the arms
buildup and the aggressive evolution of the
conflict.
7. Recommendations: Needed Types
of Research
Very briefly, some suggestions for such
groundwork are now in order.
A. QUANTITATIVE APPROACHES TO THE
CONFRONTATION IN SPACE AND TIME
An inherent assumption in analyzing con-
flict escalation in the prelude to World War
I, the United States’ involvement in Vietnam,
and the deescalation process in the Cuban
missile crisis has been that conflict reduction
is to a certain extent the reverse of conflict
escalation (Holsti, North, and Brody, 1968
and 1969; Milstein and Mitchell, 1968).
This and other reasons justify a quantita-
tive longitudinal analysis of the actions,
reactions, and interactions of nation-states
for the purpose of analyzing conflict reduc-
tion in the Middle East as a subsystem of the
international system. An example based on
Azar (1969):
In analyzing nonroutine, extraordinary, or
newsworthy actions which international nation-
actors have been taking, Azar specifically studied
the interaction between Egypt, Israel, Britain, and
France. The time period extended from January
1956 through December 1957, thus covering the
period of the Suez crisis. The analysis explores the
dynamics of conflict reduction when one party to
a conflict is composed of a differentiated alliance
(in which one actor is postulated to be the most
dominant one).
This type of analysis can be extended to
social and behavioral aspects of the conflict,
that is, to communication systems, education
and socialization for hostility or for coexis-
tence, image-evolution, etc. A closer look at
measurable trends can show the merit of cer-
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tain hypotheses (for example, Francos’ deriv-
atives from the Karameh affair); it can ex-
plicate changing aspects of the conflict and
suggest common denominators and differ-
ences between and among facets of the dis-
ciplinary research. Further, such analysis
should free us, at least partially, from the
many speculations existing in the current
efforts, and enable us to relate the work on
the Israel-Arab conflict to complementary
work on other intersocietal conflicts.
B. SENSITIVE EXTRACTION AND DIS-
SEMINATION OF KNOWLEDGE ON TRENDS
What is becoming critical is the lack of pre-
requisites for trend analysis in the area of
social services, community development, liter-
ary production, and the like. What is needed
is an effort that will succeed in making data
available by means of translation, extraction
of measurable dimensions, classification, etc.
Information on political events is relatively
available: the Arab Relations Review (Lon-
don) and the Middle Easf Record (Tel-Aviv)
report events in terms of local significance,
and therefore can be used for analyses that do
justice to Arab or Israeli event-perception.’
Good data appear also about the UN actions
in the Middle East conflict (for example,
Mezerik, 1969, and Higgins, 1969). In light
of the obvious research problems encoun-
tered in the first four efforts under review
here, one priority of research should be the
ability to account for other events as well.
An example:
An interesting, ongoing attempt is being made by
the periodical Hamizrah Hehadash ( The Near East,
Jerusalem) to extract information on the social life
of Arab countries (for example, newspaper dissem-
ination, university graduating classes, etc.). Broad-
ening of its frame of inclusion and incorporation of
4This consideration has not been taken too
seriously by most of the event-interaction research-
ers of the conflict (including Azar’s work men-
tioned above).
these materials in the Middle East Record would be
a recommended progression.
Our previous discussion suggested that
accessibility of the local language, while being
very important, would not necessarily free the
analysis from bias. The more information
available to researchers in different centers,
the less the necessity to confine further work
to existing authoritative and singular efforts.
This constraint, however, has generally been
the rule rather than the exception with re-
search on the Israeli-Arab conflict.
C. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN FOR BEHAVIORAL
FACETS OF THE CONFRONTATION
Many of the questions of language and
culture encountered at the level of cognitive
style, such as frustration, types of hostility
and its encouragement in institutionalized
manners, adulation of violence, etc., are too
complex to be treated adequately in an im-
pressionistic way. Controlled work in these
areas is needed, preferably of experimental
design. Example:
One area of study might be an isolation of the
five special &dquo;impacts&dquo; that Arabic language has had
on the patterns of thought, that is, vagueness; over-
emphasis on the psychological significance of the
linguistic symbols at the expense of their meaning;
stereotyped emotional responses; overassertion and
exaggeration; two levels of life, real and ideal-all
of which Shouby relates to special canalization and
development of deeply-rooted habits, religion,
Arab past, and Arab nationalism. His explanation
does not fully account for the rich hatred and com-
passion articulated readily by Arabs in evaluating
the conflict (Shouby, 1951; see also Chejne, 1960,
1965 and Harkabi, 1967). Such phenomena do not
exclude scientific publications (for example, the
Egyptian Political Science Review ).
Some experimental work has focused on adher-
ence to reality in the personal perception of stu-
dents and military journals. Experiments involved
Arabic-speaking students at the American Univer-
sity of Beirut and American universities. Relation-
ship between Edwards’ and McClelland’s measures
of Achievement Motivation with (relatively) cul-
turally unbiased probing of imaginative stories
indicated some special traits appearing in Arab
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language and personality which bear directly and
indirectly on Arab behavior vis-b-vis the conflict
situations (Melikian, 1958, and Ben-Dak, 1969).
It became apparent in my review that the
personal history and current association of
each author has influenced the selection of his
subject matter, and, more important, dictates
at least partially the direction of his conclu-
sions. There is very little we can do to change
this phenomenon. However, by elucidating
exact and reproducible methodologies we can
contribute to the validity and reliability of
research, thus removing much of the emotion-
ality in present discussions.
D. THE SEARCH FOR AN INNOVATIVE
MANIPULABILITY
The kind of research we need should be
typified by the opportunity to appraise the
situation before it actually occurs instead of
allowing the blind process of competition
between collectivities (and between individu-
als) to take its toll (see Washburn, 1966). It
has been argued that game-simulations can
help the search for &dquo;new,&dquo; &dquo;unidentified&dquo;
patterns in intersocietal relations. Further-
more, these are excellent teaching devices
when participants demonstrate a good grasp
of roles, images, strategies, empathy for the
situation, and (what is especially crucial for
our purposes) a feeling of potency (see Abt,
1964; Boocock and Coleman, 1966; Guetz-
kow et al., 1963; and Gamson, 1969).
One conclusion that we can draw from the
reviewed literature is that none of the authors
is able to conceptualize a scientific scenario
in which Arabs and Israelis will share senti-
ments and norms and will exchange resources
and services of yet unknown (or known)
kinds. Some relevant ideas may come from
this gaming technique. Example:
Game-simulations were created on the assump-
tion that both parties lack any real sense of em-
pathy and knowledge central to the Weltanschauung
of the antagonist, and that certain mutually agreed-
upon considerations are necessary in order to reach
agreement on a solution (Peres, 1970, and Ben-
Dak, 1969). In a game Arabs and Israelis, or for
that matter participants who have assumed their
roles, have to find a solution mutually agreed upon;
or at least certain assumptions toward &dquo;creating&dquo;
one. The very fact that the investigator can manipu-
late the situation as well as duplicate it with dif-
ferent participants allows him to reach a deeper
understanding of constraints and inducements. In
short, a range of possible, well-defined alternatives
to end hostilities are available to him.
Obviously such work is of a tentative,
mainly theoretical nature, but once it is re-
lated to empirical testing or regarded as a
sensitizing means for defining research prob-
lems, it can add considerable significance to
work on the conflict. When one looks, even
cursorily, at assessments offering a showdown
of one kind or another (for example, Sharabi,
1969), or protracted and irreconcilable posi-
tions (as Harkabi, 1969), the potential value
of gaming is clear.
E. GEARING THE WORK TO A PERCEIVED
SOLUTION
The suggestions presented above may have
particularly important effects on work on
the conflict if more researchers begin to
(1) interrelate findings from various research
strategies, suggested here, in somewhat the
same way that work in psychology could
relate testing, human factors engineering, and
leadership studies to cross-cultural studies of
values; (2) to gear systematically their re-
search to a closer look at options for a solution
of the conflict. The very fact that a solution
must have grounds in any of the social sci-
ences, be backed in time and space by knowl-
edge of trends, have specificity in terms of
ecology and be administratively unambiguous
renders the current efforts ineffective. It is the
contention of this article that we must free
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ourselves from the atmosphere of a Greek
tragedy.
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